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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an international expert 
organisation based in Switzerland that works to eliminate mines, explosive remnants of war and 
other explosive hazards. By undertaking research, developing standards and disseminating 
knowledge, the GICHD supports capacity development in mine-affected countries. It works with 
national and local authorities to help them plan, coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate 
mine action programmes. The GICHD also contributes to the implementation of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant 
instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
ALTF Advanced Liaison Task Force 
APMBC Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention  
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
AP Anti-personnel 
ASM Area Safety Management  
AV Anti-vehicle 
CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions  
CCW  Convention on Conventional Weapons  
CNLPAL National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons  
 Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères 
CNITMA National Commission for the Total Ban of Anti-personnel Mines  
 Commission Nationale pour l’Interdiction Totale des Mines Anti-personnel 
CPADD Humanitarian Demining Training Centre 
 Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post-conflictuelles de Déminage 
et de Dépollution 
DCA Danish Church Aid 
DMHTA Army Directorate for Equipment, Fuel and Transport,  
 Direction de matériels, des hydrocarbures et des transports des armées 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War 
EU European Union 
EUTM European Union Training Mission  
FAMa Malian Armed Forces  
FSD Federation Suisse Déminage, Swiss Federation for Mine Action  
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
HI Handicap International  
IATG International Ammunition Technical Guidelines  
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action 
IP Implementing Partner 
MAG Mines Advisory Group 
MDSF Malian Defence and Security Forces 
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MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali  
MoD Ministry of Defence  
NMAA National Mine Action Authority 
PSSM Physical Security and Stockpile Management  
RE Risk Education 
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
TDI The Development Initiative 
ToT Training of trainers 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
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Executive Summary  
Introduction 
This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual 
contamination and is based on both desk-top research and findings from a GICHD mission to 
Mali in March 2014. A full list of meetings held during that mission is available in Annex I.  
The purpose of the report is to document Mali’s experience of developing national clearance 
capacities to address residual contamination and to identify and present good practices and 
lessons learnt.  
Given the ongoing conflict in the northern part of the country, this case study focuses on 
capacity development of national mine action-related stakeholders to manage mine/explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) contamination more broadly, rather than on developing national 
capacities to manage residual contamination specifically.  
As a consequence of the armed conflict that erupted in northern Mali in January 2012, Mali  
currently faces a contamination problem of anti-vehicle mines (AV mines), unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Contamination is primarily in the northern and 
central regions (see map below). As of March 2014 no reports have confirmed the presence of 
anti-personnel (AP) mines. 
National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (CNLPAL) 
Mali was one of the first countries to establish a National Commission against the Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (Commission nationale de lutte contre la proliferation des armes 
légères, (CNLPAL)) in 1996.1 CNLPAL organises annual awareness missions on small arms in-
country and provides training to public administration staff and civil society representatives. The 
CNLPAL is an inter-ministerial entity, encompassing all Malian Defence and Security Forces 
(MDSF) sections. It is directly under the Office of the President and this reinforces its credibility 
and visibility.  
UNMAS  
UNMAS involvement in Mali started shortly after the outbreak of armed conflict in 2012. At the 
request of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNMAS deployed a rapid 
response capacity to Mali in January 2013, in support of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 2085. The team conducted an emergency assessment of explosive threats 
and requirements for ERW survey, clearance and risk education (RE).  
The UNMAS Mali programme is based around three strategic areas: 
1. Protecting civilians and facilitate humanitarian access. 
2. Providing technical assistance to enable national capacities to mitigate explosive threats. 
3. Providing technical assistance on explosive threat mitigation for the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) within the mission 
area of responsibility.  
                                               
 
1 Creation of the Commission through Decree N*96-304/P-RM, 14 November 1996. See also, 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/mali/shared/documents/fr/discours/1164095540.pdf. 
 
8 | 24 
 
UNMAS works in close partnership with CNLPAL, to gradually develop its capacity to take the 
lead in coordinating mine action activities and in complying with regional and international treaty 
obligations.  
In relation to strategic area two, UNMAS works with several implementing partners (IPs) to reach 
the objectives in the three strategic areas. Activities include training in explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and stockpile safety management, aimed particularly at MDSF personnel.  
Capacity development training has also been implemented through on-the-job training. Army 
personnel who successfully graduated from EOD-level three training have been attached to IP 
teams for a minimum of three months, with each army member attached to one clearance team. 
This was to provide them with on-the-job training and opportunities to apply their EOD 
knowledge practically and to further strengthen their skills. Stockpile destruction has been the 
principal focus of the operations. One of the IPs, the Development Initiative (TDI), describes 
several benefits of this capacity development collaboration, noting that it has resulted in 
strengthened relationships with UNMAS and the army, as well as improved security in field 
operations.  
The 2014-2015 MINUSMA/UNMAS work plan highlights the need to engage in further 
specialised training of MDSF personnel, noting that this should be done in close collaboration 
with the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. The long-term plan is that the Malian 
EOD capacity will eventually comprise four teams from the Army Engineers (to be deployed 
country - wide) and one team from the civil security sector (to be deployed primarily in Bamako, 
in response to potential terrorist threats).  
Key Findings: Good Practices, Main Challenges and Lessons Learnt  
Good Practices 
Several good practices can be drawn from experiences of developing national capacities in Mali, 
including:  
Inclusion of mine action in relevant UNSCRs 
Inclusion of mine action at the highest level in UNSCRs gave the sector increased visibility. This 
in turn paved the way for future activities and external support. Importantly, UNSCR 2100 (2013) 
makes explicit reference to training and support activities in mine action and weapon and 
ammunition management.  
Early and inclusive training activities  
The decision by UNMAS to start capacity development activities with the MDSF (all sections) at 
an early stage facilitated coordination and collaboration, while strengthening the trust between 
the two organisations. Early training activities sent a clear message to national partners on the  
commitment by UNMAS to work in close collaboration with them.  
UNMAS focus on capacity development and proactive approach 
The UNMAS Mali programme’s focus on national capacity development from the outset of the 
programme served to integrate capacity development as an integral part of many activities. It 
further helped to emphasise the importance of working closely with key national partners. 
Several IPs and national actors emphasised the extent to which the proactive approach by 
UNMAS has served to place capacity development at the forefront.  
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Effective coordination  
It is evident that effective, inclusive coordination between international actors (UNMAS, 
MINUSMA, EUTM and IPs), and also between international actors and national stakeholders, 
has resulted in a spirit of partnership and effective information-sharing in the Mali programme.  
National ownership   
Mali clearly illustrates how involving national stakeholders from the very beginning can 
strengthen international and national commitment to promote national ownership, including 
through capacity development activities.  
Main Challenges and Lessons Learnt 
Training initiatives  
The decision by UNMAS to train several MDSF staff from the various branches in EOD served 
an important purpose during the early stages of the programme. It strengthened trust between 
MDSF and UNMAS and clearly underlined the importance that UNMAS placed on national 
capacity development. UNMAS made a conscious decision to invite representatives from all 
MDSF branches to participate. This clearly served its key purpose. However, some of the trained 
MDSF staff had no opportunities to apply skills gained during the training when they returned to 
their duties, as was the case with traffic police, for instance.  
Only six out of 20 MDSF staff who attended the EOD-level 3 training in Benin successfully 
graduated. This suggested that the training level was too high. UNMAS is well aware of these 
challenges and will pay more attention to trainee profiles in the future, with long-term 
sustainability in mind. Another lesson learnt relates to the importance of starting with EOD-level 
1 for participants with no previous experience.   
Absorbing trained personnel  
Several informants noted challenges related to a lack of structures to absorb/manage trained 
MDSF personnel.  
The initial target of training and strengthening technical knowledge nationally has been 
achieved. The second objective of integrating EOD into a national training package, including 
training of trainers (ToT), was highlighted by many informants as a crucial next step.  
A number of senior MDSF representatives emphasised the importance of establishing a 
coordination centre for EOD operations, to facilitate effective coordination and information-
sharing. Several stakeholders believe that a centre could play an important role in absorbing 
EOD-qualified personnel. Qualified staff could also be involved in ToT activities, to promote 
sustainability. Several informants underlined that the coordination centre could play an important 
role in facilitating information-sharing, both within the MDSF and between the public and the 
MDSF.  
Long-term sustainability  
As with most capacity development activities, long-term sustainability is a challenge. Training 
initiatives may be of high quality but long-term sustainability depends on several factors, 
including available resources, opportunities to apply acquired knowledge and skills practically, 
and an effective chain of command. Most of these factors are beyond the control of the 
organisations responsible for conducting training activities, resulting in limited influence 
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regarding long-term sustainability. This paradox highlights a common challenge in national 
capacity development, one that is not unique to the mine action sector.   
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Introduction 
Background to the study 
This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual 
contamination and is based on both desk-top research and findings from a GICHD mission to 
Mali in March 2014. A full list of meetings held during that mission is available in Annex I.  
The purpose of the report is to document the Mali experience of developing national clearance 
capacities to address residual contamination and to identify and present good practices and 
lessons learnt.  
Given the ongoing conflict in the northern part of the country, this case study focuses on 
capacity development of national mine action-related stakeholders to manage mine/explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) contamination more broadly, rather than on developing national 
capacities to manage residual contamination specifically.  
Country context 
Mali is a landlocked country located in West Africa with a population of approximately 15 million. 
Ten per cent of the population lives in the three northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, 
which together represent two thirds of the entire national territory.2 It is bordered by Algeria in the 
north, Niger in the east, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea in the south, and Senegal and 
Mauritania in the west. In terms of health, education and income, Mali is ranked 176th out of 187 
countries in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index in 
2013.3 The country covers an area of 1,240,192 km2.  
Origin, nature and scope of the mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
contamination problem 
As a consequence of the armed conflict that erupted in northern Mali in January 2012, Mali 
currently faces a contamination problem of anti-vehicle mines (AV mines), unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Contamination is primarily in the northern and 
central regions (see map below). As of March 2014 no reports have confirmed the presence of 
anti-personnel (AP) mines.4  
Following Mali’s ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the 
convention entered into force in March 1999. In 2001, Mali stated that neither the government 
nor the Tuareg rebels had ever used AP mines and that there was no AP mined area under its 
jurisdiction or control. 5 Mali did not, therefore, request an extension to its APMBC Article 5 
obligations of identifying and clearing all AP mines within ten years (no later than 1 March 
2009).6 Mali has stated that it has never produced or exported AP mines. Its  Article 7 report 
states that it destroyed 5,627 stockpiled AP and 4,131 stockpiled AV mines and that it kept 600 
AP mines and 300 AV mines for training purposes.7  
                                               
 
2 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index#Complete_list_of_countries  
4 UNMAS Mali programme 
5 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mine and on Their destruction, 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/mali/  
6 APMBC, Ibid.  
7 Republic of Mali (2005). Annual Report, Article 7 Transparency Report, Form D. Accessible at 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/other_languages/french/MBC/clearing-mined-areas/Art7Report-Mali-2005-fr.pdf 
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In September 2009 and in September 2010, Mali reported 80 mined areas in the northern 
regions of Timbuktu and Kidal. Despite repetition of the existence of these mined areas, the 
exact extent of the contamination is reportedly not defined.8 
Mali is also a States Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which entered into 
force in December 2010. It has also ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
and signed CCW’s Amended Protocol II and Protocol V.9  
ERW casualty numbers sharply increased, reportedly as a result of ERW, with the most heavily 
affected towns being Diabaly, Douentza, Konna and Gao.10 There have been reports of AV 
mine-laying, around the town of Gao, supposedly emplaced by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM).11 In March 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) stated that it had 
received reports of AV mines being cleared in the Kidal region.12 While several threats from IEDs 
and AV mines have been reported by the UN, there is no evidence of cluster munitions.13  
 
Map of AT mine and ERW contamination in Mali, shared by UNMAS14 
                                               
 
8 ICBL & CMC (2013a). 
9 http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/find_profile/ML/2014  
10 ICBL & CMC (2013a). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 (As of March 2013) bid. 
14 Map shared by UNMAS Mali programme, 27 March 2014  
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Map of IED reports and incidents in Mali15 
  
                                               
 
15 Ibid.  
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Background to the establishment of the national 
mine/ERW programme  
Key actors  
National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Mali was one of the first countries to establish a National Commission against the Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (Commission nationale de lutte contre la proliferation des armes 
légères, (CNLPAL)) in 1996.16 CNLPAL organises annual small arms awareness missions in-
country and provides training for public administration staff and civil society representatives.  
CNLPAL is an inter-ministerial entity, encompassing all Malian Defence and Security Forces 
(MDSF) sections. It is directly under the Office of the President and this reinforces its credibility 
and visibility.  
Mali’s national strategy on the fight against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(SALW) is based around a ‘combined effort of coercion and awareness-raising’. The Ministry of 
Customs and the Malian Armed Forces support these efforts in the framework of their 
mandates.17  
The national action plan on the fight against the proliferation of SALW  2014 – 201818 (the action 
plan) stipulates that CNLPAL’s mission is to assist the President in creating and implementing a 
national policy against the proliferation of light weapons. The action plan notes that ammunition 
safety management (ASM) remains a great challenge in Mali and it states that insufficient 
administrative and technical control and oversight of the legal framework have further allowed 
the proliferation of weapons. A review of the legal SALW framework is currently underway (as of 
February 2015).  
The action plan presents two key factors, around which its strategic approach is based. 
1. Responding to the required norms in the field of the fight against the proliferation of light 
weapons. 
2. Combining the national, regional and local commitments and aspirations.  
Malian Defence and Security Forces  
The MDSF consists of seven security agencies:  
1. Police  
2. Armed Forces 
3. Customs 
4. Gendarmerie 
5. National Guards 
6. Civil Protection 
7. Water and Forest.  
The Army Directorate for Equipment, Fuel and Transport, (Direction de matériels, des 
hydrocarbures et des transports des armées) (DMHTA), which falls under the Malian Armed 
                                               
 
16 Creation of the Commission through Decree N*96-304/P-RM, 14 November 1996. See also, 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/mali/shared/documents/fr/discours/1164095540.pdf. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Drafted with support of United Nations regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC).  
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Forces (FAMa), is the MDSF’s logistics base. DMHTA is a key national actor, in charge of Area 
Safety Management (ASM) and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). DMHTA is 
the central weapon planning and purchasing entity and it distributes equipment to other MDSF 
branches. It also stores explosives and ammunition.  
 
UNMAS has recognised the importance of coordinating PSSM activities and sharing information. 
It has established a ‘standing working group’, with a focus on PSSM-related issues. The group, 
which includes all seven MDSF branches and UNMAS, meets on a monthly basis.   
 
The 2014 – 2015 PSSM action plan, approved by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), includes the 
following activities: 
• destroying expired stockpiles of weapons and ammunition; 
• rehabilitating armouries; 
• constructing ammunition depot; 
• training MDSF; and  
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History of Developing National Capacities  
Security Sector Reform  
Significant security sector reform (SSR) processes are currently underway in Mali. Several 
international actors are working closely with the Malian state in an effort to strengthen the state 
apparatus. They are promoting key SSR principles, including accountability, transparency and 
national ownership. Capacity development activities targeting MDSF, implemented by UNMAS 
and EUTM are contributing to broader SSR activities in Mali.  
African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
UNSCR 2085 (2012), which mandated the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA), led by the African Union and ECOWAS, authorised the deployment of AFISMA for an 
initial period of one year. UNSCR 2085 includes one explicit reference to mine action: 
12. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, as and when requested by the Malian 
authorities, support in critical areas that will be required to accompany or follow a military 
operation in the north of Mali, with respect to the extension of the Malian State authority, 
including rule of law and security institutions, mine action, promotion of national dialogue, 
regional cooperation, security sector reform, human rights and the initial demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.19 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) 
MINUSMA took over from AFISMA on 1 July 2013. They were mandated by UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 2100 of April 2013 to support the political process and carry out a number 
of security-related stabilisation tasks, with a focus on: 
• major population centres and lines of communication;  
• protecting civilians;   
• monitoring human rights; 
• creating necessary conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return 
of displaced persons; 
• strengthening the state authority; and  
• preparing the ground for free, inclusive and peaceful elections.20  
With regard to MINUSMA’s mandate in mine action, UNSCR 2100 (2013) stipulates:21 
Article 16.  
(a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority 
throughout the country.  
(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine 
action and weapons and ammunition management. 
                                               
 
19 UN Security Council resolution 2085 (2012): 
http://unowa.unmissions.org/Portals/UNOWA/Security%20council/Resolution%202085.pdf 
20 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml  
21 Ibid.  
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Article 28.  
Calls upon the transitional authorities of Mali, with the assistance of MINUSMA, consistent with 
paragraph 16 above, and international partners, to address the issue of the proliferation and illicit 
trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United 
Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe 
and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light 
weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held 
weapons and further stresses the importance of the full implementation of its resolution 2017 
(2011) 
UNSCR 2164 (2014) of June 2014, extends MINUSMA‘s mandate to 30 June 2015. The 
UNSCR makes explicit references to the importance of rebuilding the Malian security sector 
(article 13 c, ii), and assisting the Malian authorities, through training and other support, in the 
removal and destruction of mines/ERW, weapons and ammunition management (article 13 c, 
iii). 22 
As of 31 August 2014, MINUSMA had a total of 9,298 uniformed personnel (8,324 military 
personnel and 974 police), 490 international civilian personnel, 409 local civilian staff and 96 UN 
volunteers.23  
UNMAS  
UNMAS involvement in Mali started shortly after the outbreak of armed conflict in 2012. At the 
request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNMAS deployed a rapid 
response capacity to Mali in January 2013, in support of UNSCR 2085.24 The team conducted 
an emergency assessment of explosive threats and the requirement for ERW survey, clearance 
and risk education (RE).  
The UNMAS Mali programme is based around three strategic areas:25 
                                               
 
22 UNSCR 2164 (2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2164(2014)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/min
usma/facts.shtml&Lang=E 
23 MINUSMA website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml  
24 UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012),  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2085.pdf  
25 UNMAS Mali slide shared by UNMAS programme officer, March 2014  
 
18 | 24 
 
Figure 1 UNMAS strategic areas26 
With regard to the first strategic area, UNMAS participated in MINUSMA mission planning and 
the subsequent mission implementation. It has also provided mine awareness and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) training to MINUSMA peace-keeping troops. In the second strategic 
area, providing technical assistance to enable national capacities to mitigate explosive threats is 
of particular relevance and interest to this case study. It will be elaborated upon in further detail 
below. 
In the third strategic area, UNMAS organised the launch of survey and EOD activities with 
implementing partners (IPs) MSB and The Development Initiative (TDI). The number of IPs has 
since increased to include Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Swiss Federation for Mine Action 
(FSD) and Danish Church Aid (DCA).  
In terms of direct support to MINUSMA, UNMAS has provided significant assistance, including:  
• provision of essential explosive threat mitigation support for the mission; 
• delivery of explosive awareness training for 1,379 uniformed personnel from 
AFISMA27/MINUSMA and 705 UN personnel; 
• provision of specialised technical assistance, equipment and mentorship in EOD and 
counter-IED to incoming EOD companies and combat engineering units; and 
• provision of technical expertise to MINUSMA for safe handling, storage and disposal of 
weapons and ammunition during the course of forthcoming disarmament events (as 
required).28 
                                               
 
26 Diagram shared by UNMAS Mali programme, March 2014 
27 African-led International Support Mission to Mali 
28 Ibid. 
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National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
UNMAS works in close partnership with CNLPAL, aimed at gradually developing its capacity to 
take the lead in coordinating mine action activities and in complying with regional and 
international treaty obligations.  
National standards on PSSM 
UNMAS recognises the lack of standards and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) guiding 
PSSM activities and, as a result, supports MDSF with developing national standards on PSSM. 
These feature two main parts: 
1. Organisational text / framework - roles and responsibilities 
2. Best practice guidelines – procedures and systems. 
Best practice guidelines were developed based on the International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG), adapted to the Mali context. The focus of UNMAS on structures and 
procedures corresponds to standard organisational development, acknowledging the importance 
of both.  
Weapons Intelligence Teams   
As a result of prominent IED threats, UNMAS has promoted the establishment of four-member 
weapons intelligence teams (WITs), to enable a rapid response to deal with IEDs. It is hoped 
that the teams will be operational in 2015, and to have one WIT in each region (Timbuktu, Gao, 
Kidal and Bamako). UNMAS noted that the long-term goal is to include MDSF staff in these 
WITs.  
Capacity development activities  
UNMAS works with several IPs to achieve the objectives of the three strategic areas.  
MSB conducted two five-week intermediate level explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training 
courses for a total of 63 MDSF personnel.  20 of them later attended an eight-week EOD training 
course (IMAS level 3) at the Humanitarian Demining Training Centre29 (CPADD) in Benin from 
September to October 2013. A total of six MDSF personnel successfully passed the course.  
These EOD training initiatives respond to explicit requests from the Malian authorities, with the 
long-term aim of establishing an operationally independent national EOD and bomb disposal 
capacity in Mali.  
In its capacity as UNMAS IP, FSD has been involved in MSDF capacity development since 
September 2013, focusing its training on stockpile safety management. In 2013, FSD organised 
a three-and-a-half month warehouse management training, producing 57 storekeepers, 21 depot 
managers and 19 inspectors from the various branches. In 2014, FSD organised a PSSM 
inspector training, for 19 pre-selected representatives from all MDSF branches. FSD noted that 
pre-selecting training participants resulted in better training results. The level of commitment 
among these participants was high, evident in the fact that all 19 successfully graduated. FSD 
adopted a ‘broad focus,’ assessing MDSF’s strengths and weaknesses, an approach that 
allowed the training to be better targeted. This approach was highly successful and appreciated 
by MDSF as the training better responded to identified needs.   
                                               
 
29 http://www.cpadd.org/spip.php?rubrique5  
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The TDI, also acting as UNMAS IP, has mainstreamed capacity development activities in its 
ongoing operations. The six army personnel that successfully graduated from the EOD-level 
three training in Benin have been attached to TDI teams since August 2013. Following 
discussions with UNMAS, TDI invited these six army staff to join their clearance teams for a 
minimum of three months, with each army member attached to one clearance team. This was to 
provide them with on-the-job training and opportunities to apply their EOD knowledge practically 
and to further strengthen their skills. Stockpile destruction has been the principal focus of TDI’s 
operations. TDI describes several benefits of this capacity development collaboration, noting that 
it has resulted in strengthened relationships with UNMAS and the army, as well as improved 
security in field operations.  
MINUSMA/UNMAS 2014 - 2015 work plan 
The MINUSMA/UNMAS 2014-2015 work plan highlights the need to engage in further 
specialised training of MDSF personnel, noting that this should be done in close collaboration 
with EUTM in Mali. The long-term plan is that the Malian EOD capacity will eventually comprise 
four teams from the Army Engineers (to be deployed country - wide) and one team from the civil 
security sector (to be deployed primarily in Bamako, in response to potential terrorist threats).  
The intention is to continue adopting a broad approach, including training courses related to IED 
disposal and post-blast investigation.  
In addition, UNMAS plans to continue its work on evaluating weapon and ammunition stockpiles 
and in providing support on immediate threat reduction measures, physical refurbishment and 
ASM training to MDSF personnel and MINUSMA. Stockpile management support will range from 
refurbishing armouries of rural police stations to rebuilding national ammunition depots to 
recognised safety standards.30 
The work plan further highlights continued UNMAS support to CNLPAL, with a view to further 
strengthening of the commission’s capacity to gradually take the lead in coordinating the mine 
action programme.  
EUTM in Mali  
Following an official request from the Malian government, and in accordance with UNSCRs 2071 
and 2085, the European Union (EU) launched the EUTM Mali within the framework of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).31  
The EUTM includes 550 military personnel from more than 20 European nations working 
together to rebuild the FAMa.   
Established in January 2013, EUTM provides assistance at two levels: 
• advisory support designed to support FAMa’s rebuilding; and  
• training of FAMa’s combat units.  
EUTM also provides support with renovating the Koulikoro military training camp. As well as the 
transfer of military knowledge (infantry, armoured combat, engineering, artillery, logistics), EUTM 
places a strong emphasis on ethics, including cohesion, discipline and respect for international 
humanitarian law. EUTM-organised training includes EOD components.  
                                               
 
30 MINUSMA/UNMAS 2014-2015 work plan  
31 Ibid.  
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The Advanced Liaison Task Force (ALTF) forms one component of the EUTM. ALTF is 
composed of a multidisciplinary team of military advisers, with a mission to support the Malian 
authorities in rebuilding Mali defences. 
EUTM Mali is one element of a programme that aims to rebuild the Malian state. This mission is 
part of the overall approach led by the EU to strengthen security in Mali and the Sahel region.32  
The Comprehensive Approach Regional Strategy is the overarching framework for the EUTM.33   
MINUSMA’s mandate, resolution 2100 from April 2013, welcomes EUTM Mali’s mission for 
capacity building and assisting the FAMa ‘contributing to strengthening civilian authority and 
respect for human rights’ (Art. 22).34 
Regarding training targeting the FAMa, it has been pointed out that: ‘…the cohesion, the 
discipline and the culture of respect to human rights and to the civilian authorities are aspects to 
continue working on to improve the FAMa, while enhancing the training in technical and tactical 
aspects, the command and control capabilities and the logistic support.’ 35 
  
                                               
 
32 EUTM Mali  
33 Strategy for Security and Development for the Sahel, 2011:  
34 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013): 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pdf  
35 Juan Carlos Castilla Barea, The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM, 
http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2013/DIEEEO93-2013_EUTM_Mali_CastillaBarea_ENGLISH.pdf  
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Key Findings: Good Practices, Main Challenges and 
Lessons Learnt  
Good Practices 
Several good practices can be drawn from experiences of developing national capacities in Mali, 
including:  
Inclusion of mine action in relevant UNSCRs 
The sector gained visibility from inclusion of mine action at the highest level in UNSCRs. This in 
turn paved the way for future activities and external support. Importantly, UNSCR 2100 (2013) 
makes explicit reference to training and support activities in mine action and weapon and 
ammunition management.  
Early and inclusive training activities  
The decision by UNMAS to start capacity development activities with the MDSF (including all 
sections) at an early stage facilitated coordination and collaboration, while strengthening the 
trust between UNMAS and MDSF. Early training activities sent a clear message to national 
partners on the commitment of UNMAS to working in close collaboration with them.  
UNMAS focus on capacity development and proactive approach 
UNMAS Mali programme’s focus, from the start, on national capacity development  allowed the  
integration of capacity development into many of the activities. It also helped to emphasise the 
importance of working closely with key national partners. Several IPs and national actors 
emphasised the extent to which the UNMAS proactive approach has served to place capacity 
development at the forefront.  
Effective coordination  
It is clear that effective and inclusive coordination between international actors (UNMAS, 
MINUSMA, EUTM and IPs), and between international actors and national stakeholders has 
resulted in a spirit of partnership and effective information-sharing in the Mali programme.  
National ownership  
The Mali case clearly illustrates how involving national stakeholders from the very beginning can 
strengthen international and national commitment to promoting national ownership, including 
through capacity development activities.  
Main Challenges and Lessons Learnt 
Training initiatives  
The decision by UNMAS to train several MDSF, staff from the various branches, in EOD served 
an important purpose during the early stages of the programme. It strengthened trust between 
MDSF and UNMAS and clearly underlined the importance UNMAS placed on national capacity 
development. They made a conscious decision to invite representatives from all MDSF branches 
to participate. This clearly served its key purpose. It also meant, however, that some of the 
trained MDSF staff had no opportunities to apply skills gained during the training when they 
returned to their duties, as was the case with traffic police, for instance.  
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Only six out of 20 MDSF staff who attended the EOD-level 3 training in Benin successfully 
graduated. This suggested that the training level was too high. UNMAS is well aware of these 
challenges and will pay more attention to trainee profiles in the future, with long-term 
sustainability in mind. Another lesson learnt relates to the importance of starting with EOD-level 
1 for participants with no previous experience.   
Absorbing trained personnel  
Several informants noted challenges related to lack of structures to absorb/manage trained 
MDSF personnel.  
The initial target of training and of strengthening technical knowledge nationally has been 
achieved. The second objective of integrating EOD into a national training package, including 
training of trainers (ToT), was highlighted by many informants as a crucial next step.  
A number of senior MDSF representatives emphasised the importance of establishing a 
coordination centre for EOD operations, to facilitate effective coordination and information-
sharing. Several stakeholders believe that a centre could play an important role in absorbing 
EOD-qualified personnel. Qualified staff could also be involved in ToT activities, to promote 
sustainability. Several informants underlined that the coordination centre could play an important 
role in facilitating information-sharing, both within the MDSF and between the public and the 
MDSF.  
Long-term sustainability  
As with most capacity development activities, long-term sustainability is a challenge. Training 
initiatives may be of high quality but long-term sustainability depends on several factors, 
including available resources (financial, human and technological), opportunities to apply 
acquired knowledge and skills practically, and an effective chain of command. Most of these 
factors are beyond the control of the organisations responsible for conducting the training 
activities, resulting in limited influence regarding long-term sustainability. This paradox highlights 
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Annexes  
Annex I: Individuals interviewed   
Name Title Organisation 
General Brigader Coulibaly Kani 
Diabate 
President  National 
Commission Against 
the Proliferation of  
Small Arms and 
Light Weapons 
Colonel Major Nana Tiémoko 
Traore 
Director Direction du Génie 
Militaire 
General Brigader Didier Dacko Etat Major General des Armees Ministry of Defence 
Marlène Dupouy  Capacity Development Analyst/PSSM Project 
Coordinator 
UNMAS 
Charles Frisby  Programme Manager  UNMAS 
Marc Vaillant Programme Officer UNMAS 
Joseph Huber  Chief of Operations UNMAS 
Donat Blugeon Counter IED Officer UNMAS 
Eric Boulin  Training Officer UNMAS 
Etienne Huber PSSM Officer UNMAS 
Adrian Hunt Deputy Head of Mission British Embassy 
Robb Jones Project Manager TDI 
Jimmy Jean Chehab Project Manager  FSD 
Marcel Vachez Technical Advisor/Trainer PSSM 
Jean Pierre Thouvenin Technical Advisor/Trainer PSSM 
Tobias Siepenkothen  EOD trainer  EU Training Mission 
(EUTM) 
 
 
